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Comment
UNFAIR REPRESENTATION AND THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
BOARD: A FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS
DENNIS R. LEWIS
I. THE DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION
Labor unions have historically been treated as voluntary associations.
The right of a member to participate in the internal functioning of a
union was governed chiefly by the constitution and by-laws of the union.
If the judiciary chanced to intervene in the internal organization of a
union, the intervention was limited to a scrutiny of the implied contract
existing between member and union to determine if that contract had
been violated,' or to protect the property rights that had arisen out of
payment of union dues.' Recently, legislation that has defined the place
of the labor organization in the national labor policy, expressly recogniz-
ing the rights and duties of labor unions, has made the voluntary associ-
ation theory anachronistic. The employer, the union member, and the
employee who works under a collective bargaining contract and chooses
not to join the union are directly affected by statutory regulation of the
union. The purpose of this Comment is to explore the duties imposed
upon labor organizations arising out of the statutory recognition of the
union as a bargaining agent, the determination of the proper jurisdiction
and the method of achieving an adequate remedy.
A. Historical Development of Fair Representation
Unions representing railway employees are governed by the Railway
Labor Act of 1926,' providing that railway employees shall have the
right to organize for collective bargaining purposes and to choose
agents to represent them in the bargaining process.! The Act also pro-
vides that the labor organization chosen by the majority vote of the
employees in a specified unit shall be the exclusive agent for all em-
ployees within that unit.' Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R.' was
ISee Polin v. Kaplan, 257 N.Y. 277, 177 N.E. 833 (1931).
2 See Heasley v. Operative Plasterers & Cement Finishers Int'l Ass'n, 324 Pa. 257, 188
A. 206 (1936).
845 U.S.C. 5§ 151-88 (1964).
4 Railway Labor Act S 2(4), 45 U.S.C. § 152(4) (1964).
5Id.
6 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
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the basis for recognizing that the statutory authority given to the
union carried a corresponding duty to represent each employee in the
unit on a non-discriminatory basis. In Steele a Negro locomotive fireman
for the Louisville & Nashville Railroad was excluded from membership
in the union because of his race. The railway brotherhood attempted to
negotiate a contract with the carrier that would have eliminated all
Negroes as firemen. Steele complained of the union's failure to repre-
sent him and the other Negro firemen on a non-discriminatory basis
in contract negotiations. The Supreme Court recognized that while
a union is essentially a private organization, "its power to represent
and bind all members of a unit is derived solely from Congress."' The
Court concluded that commensurate with the power conferred upon
the union by Congress as the exclusive bargaining agent of all members
of the unit came the duty to represent the interests of all the employees
within the unit "fairly, impartially, and in good faith."'
On the same day that the Court decided Steele, it had the opportunity
to decide a similar case arising under the National Labor Relations Act.'
Like the Railway Labor Act, this act, covering most workers involved in
interstate commerce, provides for exclusive representation by the labor
organization chosen by the majority vote of the membership of a par-
ticular bargaining unit." Further, the union is the only authorized rep-
resentative of all the members in the unit for the purpose of bargain-
ing about wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment.' This concept of exclusive representation applies without regard
to whether an employee voted in favor of the union or chose to become
a member of it. In Wallace Corp. v. Board" the incumbent union, openly
friendly with the company, induced the employer to fire certain em-
ployees who favored the establishment of another union. The Court
found the actions on the part of the incumbent union to be a violation
of the duty of fair representation. As the "agent of all the employees,
charged with the responsibility of representing their interests fairly and
impartially"" the union had not acted in a manner consistent with the
duties of the exclusive bargaining agent by treating members of the unit
differently and unequally.
Nine years elapsed before the Court began to enunciate clearly the
7Id. at 200.
'Id.
'29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1964).
1"National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1964).
"National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) § 8(b), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964)
(emphasis added).
1" 323 U.S. 248 (1944).
"3 Id. at 256.
14 Id. at 255, 256.
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duties of the union under the National Labor Relations Act. In Ford
Motor Co. v. Huffman," the Court realized that invariably differences
would arise between the union as the bargaining agent and individual
employees as to the desirability of certain contract provisions. The union
was to be allowed a wide range of reasonable alternatives, "subject
always to complete good faith and honesty"'" in bargaining for terms
that might adversely affect particular individuals within the unit. In
Syres v. Oil Workers Int'l," a case similar to Steele, discrimination
against a Negro employee was alleged. The Court made it clear that
the duty of fair representation enunciated in Steele applied equally
to similar cases under the National Labor Relations Act. In a brief
per curiam order citing Steele the Supreme Court allowed an injunc-
tion and damages against the union because of racial discrimination."'
B. Delineating the Duty
The duty to represent all employees fairly arose out of violations that
affected the rights of individual employees. As early as 1944, the Su-
preme Court noted that in addition to the interest of employees, a public
interest must be protected."9 The public interest arose out of the investi-
ture of statutory authority upon unions with regard to all bargaining
functions arising out of a collective bargaining context. This public
interest could not be assuaged by merely refraining from active dis-
crimination against certain employees." In Conley v. Gibson" the union
neglected to object to the seniority reductions of its Negro members.
The Court found that even when the union has met its duty of fair rep-
resentation in the creation of the collective bargaining contract, the
contract may not be "administered in such a way, with the active or
tacit consent of the union, as to be flagrantly discriminatory against
some members of the bargaining unit.""
The Supreme Court recognized the duty of a union to represent all
employees fairly and impartially, but pointedly refused to define the
parameters of the duty. However, Steele indicated that the duty of fair
representation did not extend to the making of a contract "which may
have unfavorable effects on some of the members of the craft represent-
ed."'Huffman also indicated that a "wide range of reasonableness must
15 345 U.S. 330 (1953).
16 Id. at 338.
17350 U.S. 892 (1955).
Is Id.
"
9 See J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 335 (1944).
20 Id. at 337.
2 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
2 Id. at 46.
23 323 U.S. at 198.
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be allowed a statutory bargaining representative in serving the unit it
represents . . .
In Vaca v. Sipes' Owens was denied reinstatement because the com-
pany believed that his blood pressure was too high to permit him to
handle his heavy work. A union physician examined Owens and con-
curred that he would be unable to perform the work. The union there-
fore discontinued the grievance procedure on Owens' behalf, which had
already proceeded through several stages. Owens charged the union with
"arbitrarily and capriciously" failing to process the case through arbi-
tration. This situation presented the Supreme Court with the opportunity
to further delineate the substantive duties of the union arising out of
fair representation. The Court defined the duty of fair representation,
a federal question,' in terms of "good faith," concluding that a union
must in "good faith and in a nonarbitrary manner, make decisions as to
the merits of a particular grievance.""u But good faith does not mean
that the union must be correct in anticipating the outcome of the
grievance when the case is ultimately taken to arbitration or the courts.
The theory that each employee has an "absolute right"'" to have his griev-
ance taken to arbitration was rejected, although the Court agreed that
a union could not "arbitrarily ignore a meritorious grievance or process
it in a perfunctory manner . . . .'," The Court noted that a stable labor
policy contemplated a good faith attempt by labor and management to
settle contract disputes without resorting to arbitration, especially if
frivolous grievances are involved." A requirement that the union be
able to predict with absolute accuracy the outcome of the arbitration
process would perforce cause the union to process many frivolous and
insubstantial grievances. The Court concluded that "[s]ince the union's
statutory duty of fair representation protects the individual employee
from arbitrary abuses . . . this severe limitation on the power to settle
grievances is neither necessary nor desirable .. . ,,.. Thus, the union had
not violated its duty of fair representation because the record indicated
an affirmative showing of good faith and a corresponding lack of invidi-
ous and irrelevant discrimination in the handling of the grievance."'
24 345 U.S. at 338.
22386 U.S. 171 (1967).
2 Id. at 173. The Court noted that "although we conclude that state courts have
jurisdiction in this type of case, we hold that federal law governs.21Id. at 191.
28 Id. at 192.
29 Id.
" See Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) S 203(d), 29 U.S.C.
173(d) (1964) (preamble): "Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the
parties ...is ... the desirable method of settlement of grievance disputes arising over
the application or interpretation of an existing collective bargaining agreement."
21Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 191 (1967).
"Id. at 195.
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C. A Special Duty: The Civil Rights Act of 1964
The duty of fair representation arose out of statutory construction of
the Railway Labor Act and the National Labor Relations Act, since the
Court could only assume that Congress had not imbued a union with
the power to be the exclusive bargaining agent of all employees within
a unit without imposing a corresponding duty of fair representation.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964," while not replacing the
concept of fair representation, creates a statutory cause of action that
in many ways overlaps the common law duty of fair representation. The
1964 Act makes it unlawful for a labor union to discriminate against an
employee by either excluding him from union membership or expelling
him on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin." How-
ever, the enforcement of Title VII, vested in the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission,' appears to create an overlap in jurisdiction
between the federal judiciary enforcing the duty of "fair representation,"
and the EEOC preventing unlawful discrimination on the part of a
union against minority or ethnic groups. In Local 12, United Rubber
Workers v. NLRB,' the Court found that the union had not met its duty
of fair representation when it had arbitrarily failed to process a Negro
union member's claim for back pay. However, the Court went on to point
out that the Negro member "would be at liberty to seek redress under
the enforcement provision of Title VII .. .
II. ENFORCEMENT OF THE DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION:
THE COURTS, THE NLRB, OR BOTH?
Beginning with Steele, the Supreme Court made it clear that the fed-
eral judiciary would be an appropiate place to seek a remedy for a un-
ion's violation of fair representation. 8 Because the federal judiciary alone
has the duty of enforcing the provisions of the Railway Labor Act,"
"342 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 2003-15 (1964).
"Civil Rights Act of 1964 S 703(c), 42 U.S.C. § 2003-3(c) (1964). The Act pro-
vides that it is unlawful for a labor organization to:
(1) exclude or to expel from its membership, or otherwise to discriminate
against, any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex or national
origin; (2) to limit, segregate, or classify its membership, or to classify
or fail or refuse to refer for employment any individual, in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities, or would limit such employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee or as an applicant for employ-
ment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin; or (3) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate
against an individual . . ..
"Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 705, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3-5 (1964).
3368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967).
'
1 ld. at 17.
38 323 U.S. 192; see supra note 8.
"The Act sets up administrative agencies, the National Railroad Adjustment Board
19711
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there is no overlapping of jurisdiction as in National Labor Relations
Act cases where both the judiciary and administrative bodies have en-
forcement jurisdiction within certain areas.
The Court in Sipes noted that state courts, applying federal law, '
could have jurisdiction over unfair representation cases arising under the
National Labor Relations Act. Furthermore, the Office of Economic Op-
portunity has jurisdiction to ensure that unions do not discriminate
against employees when the discrimination arises out of racial or ethnic
classifications.4 '
Nevertheless, in cases arising under the National Labor Relations Act
involving unfair representation, a question exists concerning jurisdiction
to effectuate a remedy. Steele, Wallace, Hufman and Syres made it clear
that while the duty of fair representation arose because the unions were
endowed with Congressional sanction as the exclusive bargaining agent
of all employees, the federal judiciary was empowered to enforce the
duty. But the National Labor Relations Act provides for administrative
enforcement of certain provisions of the Act by the National Labor Re-
lations Board." The Board's jurisdiction is limited, however, to the en-
forcement of specified violations of the Act on the part of either the
employer or a union, referred to as "unfair labor practices."'" Thus, if
the violation of the duty of fair representation is within the Board's un-
fair labor practice jurisdiction, both the Board and the judiciary may be
enforcement agencies. It is especially important to determine if the Board
has jurisdiction to prevent unfair representation on the part of the un-
ions; in the scheme of the National Labor Relations Act the Board
exerts great influence upon the formulation and effectuation of the na-
tional labor policy.
A."Unfair Representation" as an Unfair Labor Practice
Eighteen years and two major federal labor acts elapsed after Steele
recognized the existence of the duty of fair representation and before the
National Labor Relations Board undertook the enforcement of the duty.
In Miranda Fuel Co." union member Lopuch received his employer's
permission to spend the summer away from the job, permitted by the
contract because summer was the "slack season." Lopuch left prior to
April 15, and returned after October 15, the period defined in the con-
(section 3), the National Mediation Board (section 4), and airline boards of adjust-
ment (section 204). A federal district court has the power to enforce the awards of
these agencies, or to issue injunctions protecting their jurisdiction; however, since the
boards do not have contempt powers, enforcement must be through the judiciary.
40 386 U.S. at 173; see supra note 26.
41 See supra notes 34, 35.
4 National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) § 3, 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1964).
41 National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) § 8, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1964).
"140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962).
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tract as the "slack season." The late return was excused because of ill-
ness. At the urging of some of the members who resented the untimely
leaving and return to work, the union demanded that the company re-
duce Lopuch to the bottom of the seniority list, and the company ac-
quiesced to this demand. Lopuch complained to the National Labor
Relations Board that the union had violated its duty of fair representa-
tion toward him in the handling of his case. The Board established juris-
diction, holding this to be a case falling within the list of unfair labor
practices it was empowered to prevent, thereafter finding both the com-
pany and the union in violation of unfair labor practices. ' The Board
found the union in violation of sections 8 (b) (1 ) A and 8 (b) (2) of the
National Labor Relations Act, relating to a violation arising out of inter-
ference by the union with the right of the individual employee to exercise
(or refrain from exercising) the right to organize and bargain collective-
ly through a union." The Board appealed to the Second Circuit for en-
forcement of its order reinstating Lopuch to his old seniority. 7 The court,
faced with the narrow question whether Congress had intended unfair
representation jurisdiction to be vested in the Board, denied enforcement
of the order, concluding that no jurisdiction existed. '8 Mirroring the dis-
senting opinion of one of the Board members, the court concluded that
the evil envisioned by Congress in enacting sections 8(b)(1)A and
8(b) (2) was discrimination arising out of "union membership or other
union-connected activities,"'" not union discrimination unrelated to ac-
tivities where employees rights to organize were involved. The court
45 Id.
'The following sections of the Act, S 8(b)(1)A, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)A (1964);§ 8(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1964); § 8(b)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3) (1964)
are the statutory bases upon which arguments granting "unfair representation" juris-
diction to the Board rest:
Section 8(b)(1)A. "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its
agents (1) to restrain or coerce (a) employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in
section 7: Provided, that this paragraph shall not impair the right of a labor organiza-
tion to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of member-
ship therein."
Section 8(b)(2). "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its
agents ...to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an em-
ployee with respect to whom membership in such organization has been denied or
terminated ...."
Section 8(b)(3). "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its
agents to refuse to bargain collectively with an employer, provided it is the representa-
tive of his employees ...."
Section 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1965), referred to in section 8(b) (l)A, reads as follows:
"Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor or-
ganizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and
to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from . . . such
activities . ..."
47NLRB v. Miranada Fuel Co., Inc., 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).4 1 Id. at 183.
49 Id.
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noted that the briefs of the Board, as well as the amici curiae briefs of
the NAACP and the American Civil Liberties Union, assumed the de-
sirability of bringing such controversies before the Board, rather than
before the judiciary." Judge Medina refused to accept this public policy
argument; instead he relied upon statutory construction to determine
whether Congress had intended that unfair representation be within the
jurisdiction of the Board's handling of unfair labor practices." Finally,
the court held that Congress had not intended the Board to be imbued
with powers over unfair representation cases. However, Judge Lumbard
dissented on the ground that Congress must have intended that unfair
representation cases be an unfair labor practice because it had not spe-
cifically made the violation of the Act contingent on discrimination "in
regard to ... employment because of membership in any labor organi-
zation.""2
B. A Look at the Legislative History of the Taft-Hartley Act
As the Second Circuit noted in Miranda, the "legislative history ... is
not particularly illuminating . . . ."" Nevertheless, if any sort of authori-
tative determination of whether Congress intended unfair representation
cases to be within the Board's unfair labor practice jurisdiction can be
made, there would appear to be no other source than the legislative
history. Fortunately, it is not totally devoid of any indication whether
Congress intended fair representation cases to be within the Board's un-
fair labor practice jurisdiction. Steele was not alluded to even once in the
congressional records relative to the Act, but this lack of reference could
be construed to mean either Congress did not intend to bring fair repre-
sentation questions before the Boaard, or it was so obviously within the
Board's purview that Congress felt no need to refer to Steele. The latter
alternative appears less sound, because the records nowhere indicate
that Congress ever considered the possibility that sections 8(b) (1)
A, 8(b) (2) or 8(b) (3) would ever be used as jurisdictional prerequi-
sites to handle fair representation cases.
1. Section 8(b)(1) A
The history of section 8 (b) ( 1 ) A, while not totally dispositive of the
issue, is nevertheless quite enlightening. Section 8 (b) ( 1 ) A makes it an
1ld. at 176.
" Id.: " . . . in any event, such matters of policy must be settled and determined by
the Congress. In this case our task is not to fix policy but to interpret the statute and
say what we think the Congress intended it to mean .... "
" Id. at 182. While concurring with the finding that no unfair labor practice had
taken place, Judge Lumbard felt that an unfair representation case could give rise to an
unfair labor practice if there was sufficient evidence of "restraint or coercion on the
part of the union," even if such restraint did not involve union related activities. Id. at
185.
5 Id. at 176.
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unfair labor practice for a union to "restrain or coerce ... employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7. '""5 Section 7 rights en-
compass the right to self-organize and engage in concerted activities or
to refrain from engaging in such activities.5 The Fifth Circuit in Local
12, United Rubber Workers v. NLRB" was "convinced that the duty of
fair representation implicit in the exclusive representation requirement
• ..of the Act comprises an indispensable element"'" of those rights
guaranteed in section 7, thus bringing violations within the purview of
section 8(b) (1) A. Since, of course, the employee has no choice but to
accept the majority union as the sole and exclusive representative to the
employer in regard to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment, the union's half-hearted, nugatory or even actively hostile
attitude toward an individual employee seems to have had a coercive
effect upon the employee in his right to choose freely to engage in con-
certed activity or refrain from doing so. The Fifth Circuit has tried to
incorporate the concept of exclusive representation, set out in section 9,
into the specifically enumerated rights protected in section 7, thus cre-
ating a new and greater right.
The concept of a relationship between sections 7 and 9 arises when
it is understood that section 7 rights in regard to engaging or failing to
engage in collective activities are not absolute." These rights are neces-
sarily limited because the employee has no choice but to be represented
by the majority union, if one has been duly chosen. Thus, due to the
limitation inherent in the right to refuse to engage in concerted activities,
and because the union must be the sole agent with whom the employer
bargains, the union has a special duty to avoid coercing and restraining
employees in regard to their refraining from engaging in concerted activi-
ties. An employee covered by a collective bargaining contract is affected
by the concerted activities carried on by the union, like it or not. No
great "violence is done to the structure ... of the statute if the duty of
fair representation is included among the elements of section 9, and read
into section 7."" This approach would remove the limitation that a sec-
tion 8 (b) (1) A unfair practice is limited only to union-employee rela-
tionships arising out of the desire of an employee not to join the union.
Thus, section 8 (b) (1) A jurisdiction would be extended to encompass
any coercion wrought upon the employee because of the exclusivity of
the union as the bargaining agent of all employees. It is not clear, how-
"See supra note 46.
55 Id.
-368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967).
37 Id. at 17.
58 See Sovern, Race Discrimination and the National Labor Relations Act: The
Brave New World of Miranda, N.Y.U. 16TH ANN. CONF. ON LAB. 3 (1963).
"Old. at 7.
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ever, if this result was intended by Congress in enacting section 8(b)
(1)A. In explaining his bill to the House, Representative Hartley ex-
plicitly stated that the proposed legislation "guarantees to the employee
the right to require the union... to represent him without discrimination
against him in any way or for any reason .... ""° This statement would
seem to vindicate the theory that section 8(b) (1) A violations could
include those arising out of non-union activities, especially if Congress-
man Hartley had said nothing further on the subject. However, he ex-
plained in the same speech that "any reason" included coercive activi-
ties "even [though] he is not a member of the union."" He did not eluci-
date if "any reason" merely included union membership as an example
of a discriminatory situation or if it were the extreme example of co-
ercive discrimination sought to be avoided by the Act. Later in the
same speech, his apparently forthright assertion that the employee was
protected from any form of union discrimination was further emascula-
ted when he pointed out the purpose of the bill was a "two way proposi-
tion ... to make the relationship between labor and management equi-
table . . . ."" It would therefore appear that although Congressman
Hartley specifically said that the employee would be protected by his bill
from "any discrimination" by the union, he did not intend to address
himself directly to the type of discrimination that would arise if the em-
ployee refused to join the union.
Even if it could be concluded that section 8(b) (1 )A includes re-
straint or coercion involving activities not related to the employees re-
fusal to join the union (clearly an unfair practice),' the question must
be resolved whether unfair representation itself is the type of coercion or
restraint that the Act sought to eliminate from the collective bargaining
process. Representative Halleck of Indiana noted that the Act laid down
rules that unions must follow in dealing with the employees within the
unit. Unions could not restrain or coerce workers, although "unions can
organize workers in the usual ways . . . ."" Halleck did not specify if
he felt that restraint and coercion were limited to violent acts or if they
were merely a type of activity not allowed by the Act. In analyzing the
compromise bill, Senator Murray was unable to determine if section
8 (b)( 1 )A was limited to "violence and physical coercion,"'" but he felt
0 93 CONG. REC. 3425 (1947) (emphasis added).
61 Id.
62 Id.
" See supra note 46. Section 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1965), includes "the right to ...
form, join, or assist labor organizations ... and .. .also . . .the right to refrain from
...activities ... It is to the protection of these rights that section 8(a) (1 )A is spe-
cifically directed.
6493 CONG. REC. A3347 (1947).
6193 CONG. REc. 6502 (1947).
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that if that were the intent of the section it was "unnecessary because
offenses of this type are punishable under the state . . . laws . . . . Fur-
thermore the amendment is impractical because an effective remedy...
is quick arrest . . . and conviction.""
Section 8(a) (1) imposes a restraint upon the employer from inter-
fering with the section 7 rights of the employee by making it an unfair
labor practice to "interfere, restrain, or coerce"7 employees in the exer-
cise of their rights to act in concert. On the other hand, section 8(b) (1)
limits the union's activities to those that do not "restrain or coerce."' As
the bill originally came before the Senate it had included the words "in-
terfere with" as a prohibited union activity." Senator Ives, a member of
the conference committee that eventually shaped the bill passed by Con-
gress, objected to including the words "interfere with" because they could
"easily be construed to mean any conversation .... any persuasion, any
urging . . . [thus constituting] an unfair labor practice."" Although the
words "interfere with" were dropped from the bill, Senator Taft felt
that their inclusion would not have extended the scope of unfair prac-
tices.' His staff attorneys predicted that the words were superfluous, and
their inclusion or exclusion would have no effect upon the matter since
the Board had never found a violation under section 8 (a) (1) based on
interference alone, unless the elements of coercion or restraint were also
present." In reporting back to the House on the conference bill, Rep-
resentative Hartley explained that "interference" had been deleted, "pre-
sumably because of the concern that the words 'interfere with' "" would
extend the scope of the unfair labor practice beyond those activities that
Congress did not intend to prohibit. Hartley noted that the elimination
of "interfere with" was not intended to "broaden the scope of section
8(a)(1) as heretofore affixed by the long continued practice of the
Board."" Thus, whatever activities Congress intended to prohibit,
whether they are of a violent or physical nature or of a more subtle
nature, Congress appeared to intend that section 8(a) (1) and section
8(b) (1) cover the same area exactly, i.e., those acts that the Board
6 Id.
6 7National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) § 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1)
(1964).
"6National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) § 8(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)
(1964).
6993 CONG. REc. 4270 (1947).
70 Id.
71 93 CONG. REC. 4271 (1947).
72 Id.
73 93 CONG. REC. 6373 (1947).
4 Id.
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would have considered to be coercive or restraining, and not merely
interfering, under section 8 (a) ( 1 )."
Congress appeared to envision coercion and restraint as being more
ubiquitous than acts of violence or physical restraint or coercion. Sena-
tor Taft prepared a series of rhetorical questions and answers in which
he indicated that even more subtle activities of the union could be unfair
labor practices:
Q: Does the new act give an employee any additional rights?
A: Yes. He is protected from coercion by labor unions ....
Q: Against what type of coercive conduct by the unions is an employee
protected?
A: He is protected against both physical and economic coercion. For
example ...by threatening him with loss of his job, this would be
economic coercion.76
Thus, it seems that section 8 (b) (1 ) envisioned the same type of ac-
tivities that are prohibited under section 8(a) (1) by an employer in
dealings with his employee; these activities are not necessarily limited
to coercive acts of a violent or physical nature.
2. Section 8(b)(2)
Section 8(b) (2) becomes operative when the union causes the em-
ployer to discriminate against an employee, resulting in discouragement
or encouragement of union membership."7 The original thesis of Miranda
was that a union encouraging an employer to discipline an employee
would also encourage union membership, having engendered a fear on
behalf of those who were not in good standing with the union."8 Clearly,
section 8(b) (2) is violated when the union causes an employer to dis-
criminate against an employee solely on the basis of the employee's fail-
ure to join the union.' Representative Hartley explained that section
8(b) (2) would "prohibit an employer from discriminating against an
employee by reason of his membership or non-membership in a labor
organization."'" Hartley gave examples of the type of prohibited activity
as situations where a union compelled an employer to hire only union
7' See infra note 94. As late as 1960 the general counsel for the Board had deter-
mined that the absense of actual violence or threats of violence on the part of the union
would be insufficient to constitute a violation of section 8(b)(1)A. Administrative
Decision of the General Counsel, 1960 C.C.H. N.L.R.B. 5 9088.
7093 CONG. REc. A3369 (1947).
17 See supra note 46.
"8 See supra note 45.
71 Section 8(b) (2) specifically makes it a violation for a "labor union . . .to cause
or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee with respect to
whom membership in such organization has been denied or terminated ..... (em-
phasis added).
8093 CONG. REC. 6373 (1947).
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foremen or to discharge foremen who were not union members.' He did
not say whether he envisioned the type of activity involved in Miranda,
activity having nothing to do with membership or non-membership in
the union, as being an unfair labor practice.
3. Section 8(b)(3)
The possibility has been suggested that a union could violate section
8(b) (3) in failing to carry out its duty of fair representation." Section
8(b) (3) makes it an unfair labor practice for a union to refuse to bar-
gain collectively; " section 8(a) (5) likewise makes it an unfair labor
practice on the part of an employer who fails to bargain collectively with
the union."M The Act defines the requirement of collective bargaining in
terms of "mutual obligations of the employer and the representative of
the employees ... in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment . . .. "' A reasonable conclusion
would be that a union could not bargain in "good faith" if it took a
position that was discriminatory toward individual members of the unit.
An alternative to this proposition would be that "good faith" extends
only to those "mutual obligations" arising between the employer and
the union, and does not encompass any requirement of "good faith"
between the union and the employee. In discussing the Act on the floor
of the Senate, Senator Taft expressed his view that "the purpose of the
bill is not to discipline labor leaders .... It is a bill intended to try to
equalize the relations between the employer and employee."'" With so
little history relative to the question, the Board would not render Con-
gress a great injustice by taking jurisdiction under section 8(b) (3).",
Nevertheless, the framework of the Act, calling for mutual bargaining
obligations between the employer and the union arising out of parallel
sections, would be indicative that the duty of "good faith" in the bargain-
ing process is required only in union-employer relationships, and not in
union-employee relationships.
There is still no clear answer to the question whether Congress in-
tended the Board to exert unfair labor practice jurisdiction over fair rep-
resentation questions. There is certainly no allusion to Steele or even to
the concept of unfair representation, although the concept was three
years old at the time of the Taft-Hartley Act. It is probable that Congress
81 Id.
82See Cox, Duty of Fair Representation, 2 VILL. L. REv. 151 (1957).
"See supra note 46; National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) § 8(b)(3), 29
U.S.C. § 158(b)(3) (1964).
"National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(5)
(1964).
"National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964).
"93 CONG. REC. 4437 (1947).
'" Cox, supra note 82, at 172.
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never considered the question since there is no definitive assertion that
it intended the Board to exercise such authority; indeed, the history
would allow an advocate of either position to extract isolated quotes
from the Congressional Record and conclusively prove his point, while
an equally skilled advocate could refute each item categorically. Never-
theless, it appears that Congress did not intend that the Board exercise
unfair labor practice jurisdiction for two reasons. First, Congress made
no mention of Steele or the concept of unfair representation. It could
have easily done so. Only one allusion would have been dispositive that
Congress intended the Board to assume jurisdiction. It would have been
simple to empower the Board to assume jurisdiction with a mere word in
the statute, or a quick allusion to Steele, but the absence of any indicia
should be conclusive. Indeed, that Congress did not consider the possi-
bility, is indicated by the Board's failure to assert jurisdiction for fifteen
years. Second, the scheme of the unfair labor practice jurisdiction ap-
pears to be a balancing of reciprocal duties of union and management.
Each statement indicating that Congress intended that unfair labor prac-
tices involve non-union related activities is balanced by a statement that
the purpose of the Act is to achieve equality between unions and man-
agement, supported by specific examples that allude to activities involv-
ing rights related to joining or refusing to join in concerted activity. Sen-
ator Taft explained that he was not fond of administrative procedure in
the field of labor relations, but he "believed that if we retain the unfair
labor practice procedure against employers, an effort should be made to
bring about some measure of equality by defining unfair labor practice[s]
on the part of labor unions . . . ."" Taft then proceeded to point out that
the Wagner Act had, for twelve years, made employer interference with
the employee's right to self-organize an unfair labor practice, and "all
that is attempted is to apply the same provision with exact equality to
labor unions.""
Apologists for the Board's position can forcefully argue that even if
Congress had not addressed itself specifically to the question of the
Board's jurisdiction over unfair representation, it in no way indicated
that it intended that the Board not exercise jurisdiction. Indeed, the
rights of the employee to self-organize or refrain from engaging in con-
certed activity has little meaning if the union's unfair labor practice is
restricted to those situations arising out of union-related activity. Since
the exclusivity provision of section 9 means that any action taken by a
union is binding upon the employee in the areas covered by the collec-
tive bargaining relationship, sections 8(b) (1), 8(b) (2) and 8(b) (3)
would afford little protection to the individual employee if discriminatory
8'93 CoNG. REc. 4436 (1947).
I9 1d. at 4437.
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or coercive activities were only proscribed when they arose out of union-
related activities. Congress could not have been so near-sighted as to
assume that it could make the union the exclusive agent for collective
bargaining, insure that employees would not be inhibited in their section
7 rights to self-determination whether to engage in concerted activities,
and then restrict the protection only to those activities that related to the
union acting in the area of union membership. The failure to allude to
Steele could be considered unnecessary surplusage considering the nature
of exclusive representation in the scheme of the Act. In either case, since
1962 the Board has assumed jurisdiction over unfair representation
cases, in spite of (perhaps because of) the intent of Congress in 1947.
C. Other Indicia That "Unfair Representation" Constitutes an
Unfair Labor Practice
1. The Fifth and the D.C. Circuits
Although the Board failed in its first attempt to have a violation of the
duty of fair representation enforced by the Second Circuit, it was suc-
cessful in convincing the Fifth Circuit that unfair representation was an
unfair labor practice. In Local 12, United Rubber Workers v. NLRB,"
Judge Thornberry found that unfair representation arising out of race
could constitute a section 8(b) (1) A violation. Further, in a brief per
curiam opinion in NLRB v. Local 1367, International Longshoremen's
Assoc.,"' the court relied on Miranda in finding that the duty to represent
all of the union members impartially could constitute an unfair labor
practice. Finally, in Truck Drivers, Local 568 v. NLRB 2 the D.C. Cir-
cuit recently concluded that the union's refusal to consolidate the seniority
lists when two bargaining units merged could give rise to a section
8 (b) (1) A violation, enforceable by the Board.
2. The Board's Approach
Since its Miranda decision, the Board has assumed unfair labor prac-
tice jurisdiction over the question of fair representation, despite the fact
that the Second Circuit would not enforce Miranda, and to date, only the
Fifth and the D.C. Circuits consider that unfair representation can give
rise to an unfair labor practice violation. In the early 1960's, prior to
Miranda, the Board took the position that section 8(b) (1) violations
arose only in the context of force and violence.93 In an administrative
decision issued in 1960, the general counsel for the Board asserted that
90368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967).
91 368 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967).
92 379 F.2d 137 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
11 Administrative Decision of the General Counsel, 1960 C.C.H. N.L.R.B. 5 9088;
see also Textile Workers of America, 123 N.L.R.B. 590 (1959); Twin-Knee Mfg. Co.,
Inc., 130 N.L.R.B. 614 (1961).
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" . .. in the absence of evidence of actual or threatened violence or re-
prisals by the union, insufficient basis existed for a finding that the union
had engaged in any conduct violative of section 8 (b)( 1 ) A."" However,
after Miranda the Board showed no evidence of retreating to its narrower
reading of its unfair labor practice jurisdiction. The Board asserted "that
with due deference to the circuit court's opinion, we adhere to our pre-
vious decision in Miranda until such time as the Supreme Court rules
otherwise."'" In Sipes the Supreme Court had the opportunity to settle
the question, but pointedly declined to do so, merely assuming arguendo
that such jurisdiction did exist for the purpose of deciding the merits of
the case."'
III. THE REMEDY FOR UNFAIR REPRESENTATION
In refusing to acknowledge the Board's challenge that it would treat
unfair representation as being within its unfair labor practice jurisdiction
until told otherwise, the Supreme Court in Sipes implicitly approved the
Board's practice. The following factors should be noted in considering
whether it is desirable for the Board to continue to exercise this juris-
diction:
Advantages (a) considerable expertise available when the Board ad-
judicates any problem involving the relationship of the union to its
membership; (b) uniformity resulting from a consistent body of juris-
prudential analysis when the Board, rather than the judiciary, has the
authority to enforce a duty of fair representation; (c) theoretically at
least, quicker adjudication in an administrative procedure geared solely
for labor problems; (d) less expense and greater accessibility to mem-
bers of the labor force; and (e) less formality and more opportunity for
compromise.
Disadvantages (a) the potential of overloading the Board's already
voluminous workload with unfair representation cases;' (b) the in-
ability of the Board to assess any damages against the employer, who
may be the initiator and ultimate wrongdoer; (c) the inability to affix
a remedy other than an order directing the offending union to cease
94 Administrative Decision of the General Counsel, 1960 C.C.H. N.L.R.B. 5 9088.
Local 1367, Int'l. Longshoremen's Assc., 148 N.L.R.B. 897, 898 (1964).
386 U.S. at 180.
97 Surprisingly perhaps, the Board's assumption of jurisdiction over unfair representa-
tion cases has caused no appreciable increase in the Board's caseload. In 1961, the year
prior to Miranda, the Board reported handling 2181 violations of § 8(b) (I)A. NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, ANNUAL REPORT 220 (1961). In 1962 there were 2012 al-
leged violations. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, ANNUAL REPORT 262 (1962). In
1963, the year after Miranda, the Board reported 2399 cases of alleged violations of
S 8(b)(1)A. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, ANNUAL REPORT 164 (1963). The
latest Board report for fiscal year 1969 shows 3488 alleged § 8(b)(1)A violations.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, ANNUAL REPORT 199 (1969). Section 8(b)(1)A
violations accounted for 3488 of the total 18,651 unfair labor practice cases filed with
the Board. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, ANNUAL REPORT 1 (1969).
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and desist from its unequal representation; and (d) the inability to join
the employer, assessing him for his culpability, unless actual collusion
exists between the union and the employer (in which case section
8(b) (2) would provide a remedy).
The opinion in Sipes pointed out many of the problems that may arise
in providing an adequate remedy to the employee who has been unfairly
represented by his union. The Court held that regardless of whether the
Board or the judiciary had jurisdiction over an unfair representation
controversy, the liability of the offending union was limited to the dam-
age caused by the union's failure to adequately represent the employee's
interest impartially and competently." The amount of damages would be
divisible between the union and the employer with "damages attributable
solely to the employer's breach of contract . . . not . . . chargeable to
the union, but increases if any in those damages caused by the union's
refusal to process the grievance chargeable to the employer."'" Thus, the
main problem that arises when the Board assumes jurisdiction of unfair
representation cases is the inability to provide complete and appropriate
relief to the offended employee. If Congress had not intended that the
Board should have jurisdiction, this problem would not arise since the
judiciary has the ability to summon both the union and the employer
before the bench and apportion the damages according to their respective
degree of liability. For example, if the employer fired a member of the
bargaining unit for good cause, even if the union were guilty of unfair
representation in its refusal to process the grievance, the Board's remedy
would nonetheless be incomplete since no damages could be assessed
against the employer, the party ultimately responsible for the injury to
the employee."
A. Examples of the Inadequacy of the Board's Remedial Power
1. Automative Plating Corp.
Automative Plating Corp. ° illustrates the ineffectiveness of the Board
in handling unfair representation cases. In this case the union business
manager felt that one of the union members was hostile toward the
union's position on overtime work, and he vowed to "get rid of"'0 the
dissident member. The employee had customarily performed extra work
during his lunch break, but upon discovering that he had been underpaid,
he refused to obey a direct order from his foreman to work during his
lunch hour. He was immediately discharged for insubordination. The
employee complained of his dismissal to the union, but the business
9' 386 U.S. 198.
9I id.
100Id.
"1 170 N.L.R.B. No. 121 (1968).
10'Id.
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manager who was out to "get rid of" him did not take up the dismissal
with the company. The business manager informed the employee by
letter that his "actions represented a clear case of insubordination, ''...
the reason for his discharge. The Board found that the employee's past
record had been exceptional; thus, dismissal was a much more severe
punishment than had been awarded to other employees under similar
circumstances. Finding that neither the business manager nor any other
union official above the shop level had done anything to achieve rein-
statement, the Board found the union violative of section 8(b) (1) .'
On the basis of this finding, the Board ordered the union to "cease
and desist from restraining or coercing any employee ... by refusing to
process grievances."'" In addition, the Board ordered the union to con-
sider the empolyee's grievance carefully, and, if necessary, to take the
grievance to arbitration."' The Board was careful to retain jurisdiction
over the case if its order proved ineffective."' The general counsel later
concluded that the order was ineffective from the outset and asked
that the case be reopened.' In exercising its retained jurisdiction,
the Board noted that the union's failure to process the employee's
grievance in the face of obvious employer misconduct was the underlying
cause of the employee's injury. Thus, the Board ordered that the union
pay back wages until it fulfilled its duty of fair representation or until
the employee was able to obtain substantially equivalent employment.'
The order requiring the union to pay back wages, assuming that the
employer would ultimately be found responsible for the wrongful dis-
charge, would seem to be violative of the principles of apportionment
set out in Sipes. A dissenting member agreed with such an interpretation
and suggested that the only allowable remedy would be for the injured
employee to sue the employer under section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act
for violation of the employment contract, and to join the union in the
action in order to recover the damages attributable to its unfair repre-
sentation in regard to processing the grievance."' The dissent would have
kept the Board from overstepping the bounds of Sipes in an attempt to
provide the employee with an adequate remedy."'
Even if Congress intended that the Board should have jurisdiction to











appellate approval is granted to the Board's order that the union be liable
for the lost pay, the Board would be in a much stronger position to
afford complete relief; however, such an order appears to violate Sipes
in that it affixes liability against the union in excess of the union's pro-
portionate share of the total liability.
2. Port Drum Co.
In Port Drum Co."' the union refused to arbitrate a discharged em-
ployee's grievance because the employee was not a member of the ma-
jority union, and the Board found an unfair labor practice under section
8(b) (1) A. The Board ordered the union (1) to carry the employee's
grievance to arbitration, and (2) to cease and desist discriminatory
actions on the basis of an employee's non-membership in the union.11 '
As in Automative Plating, the Board retained jurisdiction to ensure that
the order effectuated a remedy. The cease and desist order was ineffective
to insure the employee an adequate remedy, as he died before the griev-
ance was taken to arbitration. The Board therefore ordered the union
to pay the employee's estate for the lost pay accruing during the period
of discharge." ' In this attempt to effectuate a full and adequate remedy
the Board ordered the union to make up back pay even though the
employer must ultimately bear responsibility for the wrongful discharge.
However, Port Drum Co. does much less offense to the apportionment
principle of Sipes. The Supreme Court had specifically authorized the
assessment of damages against a union to the extent of "those damages
caused by the union's refusal to process the grievance .... ". Here,
damages arose out of the union's failure to process the grievance; the
death of the grievant foreclosed any opportunity on the part of the union
to rectify its earlier refusal. This appears to be a case in which the union
could be independently liable for damages arising out of a breach of
fair representation. While the union could not be responsible for the
employer's wrongful discharge, union liability predicated in terms of lost
pay appears to be a reasonable method of calculating the union's contri-
bution to the employee's injury.
IV. CONCLUSION
Steele laid the predicate for the proposition that inherent in the statu-
tory power as the exclusive bargaining agent exists a corresponding duty
of fair representation on the part of the union. The judiciary has the
power to enforce this duty. The Board does enforce it with the tacit
112 170 N.L.R.B. No. 51 (1968).
113 Id.
"14Port Drum Co., 180 N.L.R.B. No. 90 (1970).
1 386 U.S. at 198.
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approval of Congress, which has not amended the Act to exclude spe-
cifically this jurisdiction, and the consent of the judiciary, with the
Supreme Court pointedly refusing to oust the Board from its self-assert-
ed jurisdiction. Since the Second and Fifth Circuits disagree as to the
Board's jurisdiction, and since the D.C. Circuit has granted enforcement
of unfair representation questions, perhaps the Supreme Court will be
forced to decide in order to avoid blatant forum shopping for enforce-
ment of an order of the Board. For example, if an unfair representation
question were to arise in a case appealable to the Second Circuit, the
interested parties would know beforehand that the order would be un-
enforceable, but that the D.C. Circuit would find enforcement jurisdic-
tion. Thus, the party who first files his appeal in the appropriately chosen
court would be assured of the outcome.
Whatever Congress intended, if it had any definable intent, the Board
has asserted jurisdiction over fair representation cases, but in doing so
has shown a marked inability to effectuate a complete remedy. Perhaps
the question whether the Board should have jurisdiction over such cases
should be a legislative rather than a judicial determination. This could
explain the hesitance on the part of the Court to give binding guidance.
Considering that the Board is a creature of Congress, that its operating
funds are provided from that source, and that the extent of its powers is
statutorily prescribed, it is logical that Congress, rather than the ju-
diciary, should resolve the existence and extent of the Board's sojourn
into this area. For better or worse, with or without Congressional ap-
proval, with only tacit judicial approval (and, at least insofar as the
Second Circuit is concerned, explicit disapproval), and patently without
the power to effectuate an adequate remedy, the Board continues to
believe that it has been appointed as the arbiter over unfair representa-
tion cases.
